4.3: Affective-Reflective Theory of Physical Inactivity and Exercise

Although we strongly believe in an evidence-based science, we also know that high-quality empirical research can only arise from solid theoretical groundwork (e.g., Borghi & Fini 2019; Toomela, 2010). Therefore, in this section of our chapter, we will focus on theory. We will present the affective-reflective theory (ART), without detailing all the empirical studies that led to its development. We will also summarize the nomological network and paradigmatic roots of the key components of the theory, again focusing only on their most essential features. More detailed descriptions are presented in other texts(Brand & Ekkekakis, 2018; Brand & Gutmann, 2020; Ekkekakis et al., 2020; Ekkekakis & Brand, 2021; Ekkekakis & Brand, 2019).

4.3.1. Fundamental Features

We will summarize three fundamental conceptual underpinnings of the ART: (a)core affect and automaticity, (b) dual-process theory, and (c) considerations about the phenomenological uniqueness of the exercise experience.For more discussion on core affect, see Chapter 12; Zenko & Ladwig, 2021).

4.3.1.1. Core Affect and Automaticity

Many ideas in the ART center around the concept of core affect, namely a neurophysiological state that is consciously accessible at any time as a simple nonreflective feeling (e.g., Ekkekakis, 2013). It can be subjectively described, operationalized, and measured in terms of two orthogonal and bipolar dimensions:pleasure vs. displeasure (affective valence) and high arousal vs. low arousal(Russel & Feldman Barrett, 1999).Core affect is a constant component of consciousness and can oscillate (becoming more pleasant or more unpleasant) in response to changes in the internal and external environment. Some of these pleasant and unpleasant oscillations may occur automatically, in the sense that they do not require an antecedent cognitive appraisal (e.g., the immediate displeasure associated with pain) and,in some cases, cannot be intentionally changed or controlled at the moment when they occur (Bargh, 1994).¹² While some degree of stimulus processing (no matter how fast or rudimentary) is always required, by definition, core affect is a conscious, lived experience. While core affect is always accessible to conscious awareness (e.g., if we deliberately turn our attention to how we feel at any moment) changes in core affect, provided that they are large enough, may also force a shift of attentional focus (e.g., the sudden shift of attention in response to a loud noise nearby).

All the psychological theories highlighted in the first part of this chapter emphasize the importance of reflection and rationality in achieving behavior change. Possible effects of core affective states that occur automatically remained unconsidered (at best, their role was considered as being indirect, as in affective states biasing reflective cognition; see Table 4.1).

In a sense, the few cognitivist theories that have been considered in exercise psychology prescribe how the physically inactive individual should think about the behavior, in order for behavior change to be achieved. For example, these theories imply that practitioners should facilitate the development of positive outcome expectations (SCT and TTM). Individuals are supposed to gain confidence in their ability to succeed,even in the face of difficulties (SCT and TTM), learn that there are good reasons for a positive attitude toward the new behavior (TPB), or recognize and accept that the behavior can align with one's personal values and goals (SDT).So, from the perspective of these cognitivist theories, behavior change should follow naturally from rationally reflecting on the positive outcomes that may occur in the future.

The ART of physical inactivity and exercise is different. Here, the personal experiences with exercise the individual has had in the past are especially important. More precisely, the theory is about the core affective feelings (such as pleasure and displeasure) that the individual had experienced during previous episodes of exercise,which are automatically re-actualized (summarily, as a core affective state) in the moment individuals are presented with an opportunity to be physically active.This automatic core affective feeling is immediate and influences all further processes. It can color subsequent mental reflection, you can try to suppress it or let it carry you, and it can translate directly into a behavioral impulse. The ART is about affect that occurs automatically.

4.3.1.2. Dual-Process Theory and Core Affect

The dual-process framework is historically a brainchild of cognitive psychology. It is rooted in early experimental findings, which showed, for example, that the justifications declared by participants as reasons for their behavior in an experiment did not match their actual behavioral responses (Wason & Evans, 1975). This led to the psychological theory that there might be a duality of social information processing: one type that is independent of active deliberation, which would influence behavior primarily when the individual acts quickly and spontaneously, and a second type that directs behavior through active deliberation(e.g., Evans, 1989).According to more recent terminology, some authors assume fast and automatic processes that deliver a default response (so-called "Type-1"processes) and controlled higher-order reasoning processes(so called "Type-2" processes; Evans & Stanovich, 2013).

On the other hand,there is also a unimodel view (e.g., Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011), according to which the nature of the task (e.g., behaving under imposed time pressure) and working memory capacity (e.g., if one is tired and unable to concentrate) determines the rules by which information is processed within one and the same cognitive system. Depending on these two factors (nature of the task and working memory capacity),information may be processed in more detail or mental shortcuts may be followed that ignore parts of the information. One of several proposed shortcuts is the affect heuristic.According to this idea, "representations of objects and events in people's minds are tagged to varying degrees with affect"(Slovic et al., 2002, p. 400). Instead of making the mental effort to deliberate(or when the information is too complicated or voluminous), it is often easier and faster to simply rely on the affective tags recalled by the situation: pleasant tags attract, appeal, or entice (approach tendency), whereas negative tags deter, repel, or repulse (avoidance tendency).

Although the ART focuses on affect and aspects of it might be sufficiently addressed in the unimodel view, it is a genuine dual-process theory. We will explain this with regard to the notion of a conflict between Type-1 and Type-2 processes inherent in the ART (see below for more on this point). In this context,it is critical to recognize that the ART, unlike other dual-process theories,fundamentally refers to the mental and somatic phenomena related to PA and exercise,and not only to the processes of judgment and decision making in general.

The ART follows aline of theorizing introduced by early social psychologist Kurt Lewin, who contributed an idea that lost its prominence after the rise of cognitivism. His theory explained behavioral changes as a consequence of a disturbed equilibrium of driving forces and restraining forces in the psychological field of the individual (Lewin 1943, 1951).When possibilities for a behavioral shift emerge, forces can arise that drive you toward this shift. At the same time, other forces may hold you back,keeping you idle at your current state.This creates tension (i.e., conflict) that may continue until one of the two opposing forces prevails.

From the unimodel perspective,the notion of opposing forces is obsolete.It appears in rudimentary formin the social-cognitive construct of outcome expectations (Bandura, 1986) that implies a consideration of possible pros and cons of alternative behavioral options.However, it is most apparent in dual-process theories of social cognition, where the Type-1 and the Type-2 processes are seen as being in competition for control over behavior (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004).In the ART,it is assumed that conflict may arise between a fundamentally affective Type-1 process and all rational considerations that may occur in Type-2 processes (Figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4. Illustrating of Negative Core Affective Feelings as a Restraining Force

Note. According to the ART, negative core affective feelings (e.g., "Exercise feels unpleasant") may present a restraining force to rational reflection about, for example, the benefits of exercise (e.g., "I know exercise is healthy").Image of boxing gloves courtesy of royalty-free photo from Pickpik.

The ART fundamentally differs from other dual-process models (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Conroy & Berry, 2017) in regard to how affect is conceptualized.In the field of social cognition, various authors have pointed out that fundamentally cognitive Type-1 processes may be affectively tinged or colored in certain ways(e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The concept of a "gut feeling"as a process output is also invoked extensively in the unimodel view (Gigerenzer, 2007). However, and this is the crux, gut feeling in all these earlier psychological works is used as a label for an otherwise ill-defined mental state.This is different in the ART. Here,the possible Type-1 restraining force is explicitly specified as a distinct core affective state. Let us explain.

Core affect is the experiential substrate of an organism's neurophysiological and somatovisceral state. In this regard, core affective feelings give us summaries about the condition of the body(e.g., the perturbation or satisfaction of homeostatic needs). Although it is difficult from a neuroscientific point of view to anatomically and functionally separate the cognitive from the affective in the brain, people experience core affective feelings as phenomenologically distinct from thoughts (Duncan & Feldman Barrett, 2007).In some of the frameworks discussed above, the affective gut feeling is often reduced to its cognitive reflection(e.g., as if asking oneself "how do I feel?", thus turning feeling into another piece of information subject to reflection). This is consistent with the mainstream in general cognitive psychology, which aims to explain all behavioral domains in terms of cognitive processes.¹³ Nevertheless, it is problematic with regard to the explanation of physical inactivity (i.e.,avoidance of PA and exercise) and the resulting recommendations for intervention.

As appropriate and useful as previous dual-process theories (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999) and unimodel theories of social cognition (e.g., Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011) may have been to explain, for example, racist behavior or expert judgment and decision making, behaviors like these feel—in a somatic sense—very different compared to physical exercise. The feature of the ART that distinguishes it from other dual-process theories (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; as well as Conroy & Berry, 2017) is that it incorporates an explicitly hedonic perspective (Ekkekakis & Zenko, 2016) within the dual-process framework,by emphasizing the significance of exercise-related core affect as the core feature of its Type-1 process.

4.3.1.3. The Exercise Experience

In contrast to other theories in the beginning of the chapter, the ART explicitly and exclusively refers to one specific behavioral domain, namely physical inactivity and exercise. But wait, is that two or just one? Let us explain.

From a public health perspective, it is important to distinguish behaviors like taking the stairs and walking for transportation (i.e., PA) from going to the gym and jogging (i.e., exercise). After all, the former may be easier to integrate into one's daily routine and can be achieved incidentally, whereas the latter usually needs to be planned, often requires extra time, and may, therefore,be more difficult to adopt as an element of one's lifestyle.However, both will trigger similar physiological adaptations in the body,and both can accrue important health benefits. For people who have been physically inactive for years and are perhaps overweight, climbing stairs may cause as much sweating and heavy breathing as running would for a trained exerciser. We all understand this, as part of our everyday experiences: the more intense a PA is,the stronger the cardiovascular response will be.

Let us then relate this to the question of how PA, namely the physiological state aroused by it,feels. Exercise psychology studies provide evidence-based answers to this question (see Ekkekakis & Brand, 2019). During PA or exercise performed at moderate intensity, most people report that they feel increased pleasure(i.e., pleasant core affect). Heavy intensity, which is challenging though not yet overwhelming,triggers feelings of reduced pleasure especially in the untrained, whereas more experienced exercisers may still report rising pleasure.Feelings of reduced pleasure or even rising displeasure prevail under severe intensity. After a bout of strenuous exercise has ended, most people report a positive affective rebound(e.g., think of the rush of pleasure one feels within minutes after a strenuous bout has ended and the cool-down has begun). Some people may be (rightly) proud of having made it through the bout, even though the activity was exhausting,whereas others will be just relieved that the hard effort is over. Although only a few studies have examined whether feelings during and after PA or exercise influence future PA behavior, it appears that, while the correlation between in-task (i.e., during-exercise) reports of pleasure-vs-displeasure correlate with subsequent PA,the correlation between postexercise affect and future behavior is near-zero(Rhodes & Kates, 2015). A possible explanation for this near-zero correlation may be that ratings of pleasure after bouts of exercise or PA generally tend to be positive (i.e., with limited interindividual variation), concealing whether this positivity reflects a continuation of positive feelings throughout the experience or a postexercise rebound from negativity to positivity.

Furthermore,it is known from anecdotal reports and survey studies that many people who do not like exercise and tend to avoid it report negative past affective experiences,such as those associated with physical education (e.g., Ladwig et al., 2018; Massey et al., 2021), or recall negative affect from previous attempts (e.g., Ekkekakis et al., 2016). What is becoming increasingly clear from these sources is that it is not only the somatic perceptions during exercise (e.g.,pain, discomfort, breathlessness, exhaustion) that may be influential for future behavior. Negative memories associated with the social and cultural environment within which exercise experiences are embedded are also important (e.g., embarrassment, humiliation, or feelings of guilt). Both unpleasant somatic experiences and social emotions can make negative feelings reappear at the very thought of doing something similar.

Together, these insights have formed the third fundamental postulate of the ART of physical inactivity and exercise: the ART assumes that individuals often remain in their current state of physical inactivity because of their unpleasant experiences with exercise-related situations in the past. Importantly,exercise-related situations include even those that make you feel "as if"you are exercising (e.g.,breathing hard while hurrying up a flight of stairs, or feeling bad because you think you are clumsy). In response to an exercise-related stimulus, these experiences are automatically recalled,and associated sensations may be re-actualized. If this Type-1 process evokes a negative feeling,this can provide a restraining force that opposes any subsequent rational reflection and evaluation (Type-2 process) that might tend to propel the individual to be active.

Photo by RUN 4 FFWPU from Pexels

4.3.2. The ART Process Model

The first step in understanding the ART (Figure 4.5) is to think of a situated process, in which an individual notices an exercise-related stimulus.It is presumed that this typically leads to an immediate psychological response,though only sometimes to an observable change in behavior. Exercise-related stimuli can be external (e.g., someone telling you to get off the couch to go exercise) or internal(e.g., a cyclist thinks about continuing a little while longer). Once noticed, a stimulus will trigger a Type-1 process first.

4.3.2.1. The Type-1 Process

This Type-1 process involves the activation of automatic associations. These can be understood as the individual's spontaneous recollection of situations akin to the behavioral option that was brought to mind by the stimulus. Automatic associations give rise to what has been termed the affective valuation of the behavioral option in the ART. The affective valuation is a feeling of pleasure or displeasure, depending on the associations that past exercise-related stimuli have established. This response is conceptualized as a minimal core affective response, inherently imbued with an approach impulse if positive affective valence is felt and an avoidance impulse if the valuation is negative.

Figure 4.5. Process Model of the Affective-Reflective Theory (ART) of Physical Inactivity and Exercise

Note. Reproduced from Brand, R. & Ekkekakis, P. (2018). Affective-reflective theory of physical inactivity and exercise. German Journal of Exercise and Sport Research, 48,48–58 (2018).

https://doi.org/10.1007/s12662-017-0477-9 under a Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).

4.3.2.2. The Type-2 Process

According to the ART, the Type-1 process is followed by more rational consideration only if the person is willing and able to apply cognitive self-control (Gillebaart, 2017) for the reflective evaluation of the exercise-related stimulus (for more on self-control, see Chapter 22; Englert et al.,2021). This requires the individual to deliberately process and confront the associations, feelings,and the behavioral impulse that accompanied the encounter with the exercise-related stimulus as the result of the preceding Type-1 process. The Type-1 process,therefore,provides an affective default value for the subsequent Type-2 processing. The Type-2 process may include addressing the more complex emotions arising from memories of past experiences, as well as rational thought processes, such as thoughts about the pros and cons of a possible change in behavior, self-efficacy beliefs, or one's personal values as they relate to the situation. The Type-2 process can result in an action plan(e.g., an intention to be active) that may either (a) build upon the approach or avoidance impulse generated by the Type-1 process, or (b) lead in the opposite direction.In the latter case (i.e., when the two forces are in conflict), it is again a question of whether a person is willing and able to apply self-control to enforce the decision to change behavior in the rationally preferred way and whether, in the end,the action plan will be carried out or not. This is why the Type-2 process can be seen as the "interventionist"that may or may not devaluate the automatic affective response to the exercise-related stimulus (which also explains why the ART is a default-interventionist model).

4.3.2.3. Process Interaction

The linear sequence of processes and elements described above is a useful simplification, intended to facilitate the understanding of the basic assumptions and postulates of the ART and how they can be tested. However, like most models,this likely represents an oversimplification of the psychological processes involved.Perhaps a more realistic approach would be to consider that the two processes are in constant interaction (Figure 4.6).

There may be stimuli for which the automatic affective valuation is so strong that it enters consciousness even without the need to deliberately focus our attention on this response. Often, however, the affective valuation may be more subtle and may only be noticed if one deliberately reflects on a possible behavioral change. Reflecting on the exercise stimulus and actively dealing with the initial feeling will, in turn, influence how one feels. For example, an unpleasant feeling evoked at the idea of having to go for a run might turn into full-blown affective aversion only after the more reflective examination of this behavioral option; this feeling will again be automatically sensed, and will "color" further reflection accordingly. That is why the linear sequence of elements outlined in Figure 4.5 must be understood as a regulatory process loop (as indicated by the arrows in Figure 4.6), which, once the Type-2 process is involved, will come to an end when individuals stop reflecting on whether they want to change their behavior now.

Figure 4.6. Constant Interaction of the Type-1 and the Type-2 Processes in the Affective-Reflective Theory

4.3.2.4. Learning

Imagine a person who has never (ever!)been physically active (theoretically; this is just a thought experiment). Let's assume that this person encounters,for the first time,an exercise-related stimulus. For example,some friends may ask our novice exerciser, let's call her Claudia, if she would join them for a run. This question would ordinarily trigger automatic associations stemming from past experiences with running or exercise, in general. In our example, however, associations directly related to running cannot arise, because Claudia has not yet had any experience with PA. Let us assume that Claudia's automatic affective valuation of that unknown, novel behavior will be positive, perhaps because she knows and likes the individuals asking or has heard in the news that exercise is supposed to make people feel better. So, an immediate approach impulse would follow. Claudia takes the time to reflect on whether she has the time to follow her friends' invitation anyway. Thoughts and feelings are weighed and finally lead to the intention to join in the run.While exercising, Claudia learns a lot. Her friends explain that exercising is healthy. However, running is exhausting and having to breathe so heavily doesn't feel good. To make matters worse, her friends grin about Claudia's puffing red face. In the evening, Claudia thinks that it might not have been worth the effort.

A few days later, Claudia is sitting on the couch and remembers that exercise is said to be healthy. Automatic associations,which are based on encoded affect and thoughts about her first experience with exercising, are triggered immediately.¹⁴ The mere thought of exercise sparks an uneasy feeling (automatic affective valuation), and Claudia literally sinks a little deeper into the couch (the action impulse). She ponders that exercise, although supposed to be healthy, was quite strenuous,and she remembers that the people who saw her last time must have had a great laugh about her silly red face(reflective evaluation). Thinking about it like this, Claudia's memory of it gets worse and worse (encoded affect and cognition). But although something inside her resists (the automatic negative affect, a restraining force), Claudia actively (self-control) decides to get up and go out for one more try.

What do you think? How does this story continue? This example is designed to illustrate a general psychological principle as the central learning mechanism incorporated in the ART. The law of effect, whose origin dates to the era of behaviorism (Thorndike, 1911) but remains widely adopted in modern associationist models of thinking and behavior (Mandelbaum, 2020), states that, if a behavior is paired with pleasure, it becomes more likely to be repeated, whereas, if it is paired with displeasure, it becomes more likely to be avoided. This must not be misunderstood as an assertion that people only do what they find pleasant, and always avoid what they find unpleasant (Murphy & Eaves, 2016). Rather, with regard to the ART, our main point is to emphasize that the acceptance or avoidance of exercise routines is primarily the psychological result of repeated physical experiences with exercise and exercise-related behaviors (i.e.,experiential learning) and not primarily the result of gaining knowledge, for example, about the benefits of exercise and information about how to change one's own behavior. In other words, affect matters.

The regulatory loop explained above (Figure 4.6),together with the reinforcement mechanism postulated in the law of effect, provide the basis for the (necessary) "learning to like exercise,"which is an essential feature of the ART.

4.3.3. Empirical Evidence

The ART was published in 2018,building upon initial empirical findings that made the central postulates of the theory seem not only plausible but justified.¹⁵ Since then,more data have been produced. For example, initial studies have assessed the somatic core of the automatic affective valuation of exercise-related stimuli. Heart rate variability may be a useful indicator for this. Studies have shown, for example, that exercisers' and nonexercisers' heart rate variabilities differ significantly during the presentation of exercise-related pictures (Schinkoeth et al., 2019; Schinkoeth & Brand, 2019).

The results of a study using eye-tracking methodology are also interesting (Cheval et al., 2020). Cheval and colleagues (2020) showed that exercise-related stimuli induced an approach impulse (an attentional bias directed at the exercise-related stimulus) only in study participants who reported being regularly physically active.

Moreover, the importance of self-control, namely the theorized "condition"in the ART under which reflective processes are expected to influence behavior more strongly, has been underlined recently in systematic reviews (Audiffren & André, 2019). It has been shown, for example, that improvements to executive function predict PA maintenance after exercise interventions especially when environmental support for PA is low (Best et al., 2014). Executive functions help to convert intentions into physically active behavior, thereby supporting a central claim of the ART (Pfeffer & Strobach, 2017), and arguing in favor of models specifying this role for self-control processes (Strobach et al., 2020). Other authors have illustrated that people are less likely to exercise on days when they feel stressed (Englert & Rummel, 2016).

Furthermore, the authors of a new meta-analysis (Chevance et al., 2019)concluded that the correlation between automatic associations and PA is significant, albeit small. However, the observed small effect size is most likely due to the fact that the authors could only include empirical studies that focused exclusively on the direct relationship between automatic associations and behavior.This approach does not take into account the theorized (in the ART) moderation of this relation by self-control. When self-control is applied effectively, human behavior would be mainly controlled by reflective processes and this would, therefore, attenuate the magnitude of the correlation between automatic processes and behavior.This more complex relationship between automatic processes, self-control,and behavior warrants further research.

Notwithstanding such progress in empirical studies, it is important to note that the ART is still a relatively recent theory.Therefore, further studies are certainly needed.We would like to especially encourage the initiation of applied research programs ,to investigate the usefulness of ART-derived intervention elements. In this early phase of research, pilot studies are valuable (e.g., Vazou et al., 2019), as will be more elaborately planned long-term RCTs (e.g., Ladwig et al., 2021).

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References

¹² Reviewers concluded that many psychological processes must not be misconceived as being either automatic or controlled (Bargh, 1994). Instead, the extent to which the process is unintentional, occurs outside awareness, is uncontrollable and is efficient in its use of attentional resources, defines the degree to which it should be considered to be more or less automatic.

¹³ In the psychology of judgment and decision making, too, signs are emerging for a paradigmatic shift towards what has been termed embodied cognition. A conceptual framework related to the domain of sporting activities has recently been published by Raab (2020).

¹⁴ The activation of these associations makes it more likely that they will reappear as soon as Claudia thinks about exercise on another occasion (indicated by the small arrow pointing upwards from automatic associations to encoded affect and cognition in Figure 4.5).

¹⁵ These are presented in the original publication of the ART by Brand and Ekkekakis (2018).